Abstract:
This dissertation deals critically with two focal issues. One is the belief in the
existence of something with an intrinsic nature, underlying, specially the human individual.
The other is the relevance of this belief to the classificatory methods of doctrines adopted in
theNikaya.
This dissertation, explaining at the outset what this something with intrinsic nature is,
presents a critical account of the Buddha's early encounter with this belief as reflected in the
Nikaya. By citing Sutta evidence, it is shown how the Buddha countered this belief. From this
point the dissertation directs its focus to more important aspects bringing to light early Suttas
evidence, the Buddha's critical and more concrete and pragmatic arguments he presented to
reject this belief. Then, the examination proceeds to explain how sectarian Buddhism faced
this moot issue, at times even presenting innovative ideas, making the issue still more
complex and complicated. In
this context, special focus has been laid on Sarviistiviida views,
and the Miidhyamaka responses. Then, the dissertation makes a general, but insightful survey
of the Nikiiya that serve as the most primary sources and inquiries into classificatory methods
of doctrines adopted in them.
It is also shown how, with the change of circumstances and the expansion of the
audience to include the lay-disciples, a new phase of teaching developed bringing to
prominence basic moral teachings and principles of social philosophy, sometimes over
shadowing doctrinal and philosophical issues. It is also shown what influence it had on the
classificatory methods of the doctrines. These as well as other relevant issues have been taken
into consideration when arriving at a critical and balanced conclusion
